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I. Introduction
Positive moments in international climate diploma-
cy generally do not last very long. On 18 November
2004, Russia finally completed its ratification of the
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In
accordance with Article 25.1, Russia’s ratification
was the last one needed for the Protocol to enter
into force, which took place amid worldwide cele-
brations on 16 February 2005. International clima-
te policy has thus entered into a new era: For the
first time, industrialised countries are legally com-
mitted to reducing their overall greenhouse gas
emissions.
It was against this background that the 10th
Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC
convened in Buenos Aires from 6 to 17 December
2004 with more than 6000 participants. And at first
the good news did not stop there. Almost simulta-
neously with Russia, Nigeria had also announced
its ratification of the Protocol. Because Nigeria is a
member of the Organisation of Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries (OPEC) and one of the most pop-
ulous countries in the world, its ratification was of
considerable strategic significance. Other countries
– among them Indonesia – announced their ratifi-
cation as well, raising the total number of Parties to
1321. In addition, on the first day of the COP,
Canada dropped its demand to be accorded a spe-
cial emission discount for its export of hydro ener-
gy to the United States, which had consumed con-
siderable energy in the negotiations for some time2.
One could have expected the EU to be in a jubi-
lant mood at this COP. After all, it was mainly due
to the Union’s persistent efforts that the Kyoto
Protocol prevailed, after the newly elected Bush
administration had voiced its opposition in early
2001. Its entry into force is therefore a major “soft
power” policy achievement of the EU. Nevertheless,
after brief signs of enthusiasm by representatives
of the EU delegations and the UN secretariat, it was
left to members of the Climate Action Network of
non-governmental organisations (and some
Ministers like German Environment Minister
Jürgen Trittin) to celebrate the forthcoming entry
into force of the Protocol. The conference very
quickly moved back into its familiar habit of strug-
gling over technical details and worrying about the
future of the regime. As the representative of the
US clarified right at the beginning, the administra-
tion of President Bush would not change its nega-
tive attitude towards the Protocol and considered
discussions about the future of the regime “prema-
ture”. Instead, the strategy of the United States con-
tinues to focus on technology initiatives (e.g. car-
bon capture and sequestration and hydrogen tech-
nologies) as well as operating under bilateral agree-
ments rather than a broad multilateral process.
In the multilateral arena of COP 10, the re-elect-
ed Bush administration, accompanied by its tradi-
tional ally Saudi Arabia, resumed its unhelpful role.
The conference had barely opened, when the US
proposed to delete agenda items which envisaged
input from the UNFCCC to the upcoming 10-year
review of the Barbados Programme of Action for
the Sustainable Development of Small Island
Developing States, to the World Conference on
Disaster Reduction, and to the fourteenth meeting
of the United Nations Commission on Sustainable
Development, which will focus on energy3. The
motivation behind this move may have been to
prevent recognition of the possible impacts of cli-
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mate change in other fora. The US delegation also
attempted to replace the words “climate change”
each time they appeared in a document with the
vague term “climate variability”. 
The question of “how to deal with the US” was
thus once again one of the key concerns at this con-
ference. The European Union made a rather futile
attempt to “dance” with the United States in Buenos
Aires, soon realizing that it takes two to tango. The
main arena for this attempt was a rather innocent
issue, namely the question of whether to organise
seminars to discuss future directions of the regime.
This issue is explored next, followed by an analysis
of the decisions taken on adaptation and the Clean
Development Mechanism as well as of other deci-
sions. The article concludes with an outlook on
international climate policy in the years to come.
II. Pathways into the future
How to chart the way forward after 2012 loomed
large in Buenos Aires. Aside from the substantive
issues, namely the design, scope and extent of futu-
re targets, the forum for negotiations is of some
importance. There are in principle two possibilities:
Negotiations could take place within the framework
of the Convention’s COP or within the framework of
the future Conferences of the Parties serving as the
Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol
(COP/MOP). In the latter, the US and other coun-
tries that have not yet ratified the Kyoto Protocol
would be able to attend as observers, but without
the right to vote. Negotiating within the COP pro-
cess, on the other hand, would include the US as
fully-fledged party, which many States would favour
in order to ensure its presence in any future process.
However, this would also provide the US with a veto
that, as matters currently stand, could render a con-
structive process more difficult. This issue was a
major topic in informal discussions even though it
will not be formally deliberated until COP 11 and
COP/MOP 1 (November/December 2005). 
A faint tectonic trembling as a warning of the
eruptions to come could already be felt at COP 10.
The question of how to initiate talks on the future
of the regime revolved around a proposal circulated
by Argentina to conduct two seminars in 2005
aimed at an exchange of views in preparation for
the future negotiations on the post-2012 period.
However, this seemingly innocent proposal, termed
by the Dutch lead negotiator “talks about talks
about talks”, was heavily opposed by the US and
Saudi Arabia. At the start of the second week, the
US informally circulated a “Draft text of a seminar
decision the US could accept” according to which
there would have been only one seminar, which
would have provided a forum for discussion only
about past activities. In addition, their proposal
explicitly excluded any reporting back to COP 11,
which would have ensured a one-off event without
any follow-up.
Initially, many developing countries, which usu-
ally aim to present a united front in the so-called
Group of 77 and China (G-77 and China), were also
sceptical about the proposed seminars. They were
concerned that they could lead to an early debate
about new developing country commitments even
before industrialised countries had to implement
theirs. Referring to industrialised countries’ histori-
cal responsibility for global warming and pointing
out that meeting their development needs will nec-
essarily increase their greenhouse gas emissions,
they have so far always strongly rejected such pro-
posals. Especially Brazil, China and India, and thus
almost all of the leading developing countries, were
opposed to the seminars. It was therefore left to the
EU to champion the seminars, with some aid from
the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), which,
due to rising sea levels, will be among those worst
hit by climate change. 
Things were further complicated when Raúl
Estrada-Oyuela, the Argentine “father of the Kyoto
Protocol”4 and in Buenos Aires adviser to the presi-
dent of the COP, decided to directly link the issue of
the seminars to other critical negotiations on adap-
tation and financing. This package was negotiated
during the last days in a small group of high-level
negotiators chaired by Estrada. The deliberations
behind closed doors continued after the supposed
close of the conference into the early morning
hours of the weekend without coming to an agree-
ment. The decision on the seminars was only
reached after an exhausting discussion in plenary
combined with (again) informal consultations dur-
ing sunrise of Saturday morning. 
As adopted, the decision was rather weak and
did in many respects resemble the informal pro-
4 The decisive role of Raul Estrada-Oyuela during negotiations at
COP 3 is described in Oberthür/Ott, The Kyoto Protocol. Inter-
national Climate Policy for the 21st Century, 1999, pp. 77-91.
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posal by the United States: Only one seminar will
take place back-to-back to the meeting of Subsidiary
Bodies in May 2005 (SB 22)5. Its main focus will be
the exchange of information on existing policies
and measures. The intention is clearly not to feed
new policy options into the process, as the text
starts by affirming that the seminar is to be con-
ducted ”without prejudice to any future negotia-
tions, commitments, processes, frameworks or
mandate under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Pro-
tocol”6. Furthermore, the seminar does not have a
clear mandate to provide guidance to the UNFCCC
process apart from making the proceedings “avail-
able to Parties (…) for their consideration, bearing
in mind that this seminar does not open any nego-
tiations leading to new commitments”7. 
Discussions on future policy options are not
explicitly prohibited, however. A phrase derived
from the “Delhi Ministerial Declaration on Climate
Change and Sustainable Development”8 adopted at
COP 8 even opens a window for interpretation,
namely to “promote an informal exchange of infor-
mation on actions relating to mitigation and adap-
tation to assist Parties to continue to develop effec-
tive and appropriate responses to climate change”.
III. Assisting developing countries 
in their adaptation efforts 
The question of how to help developing countries
adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change has
been gaining in prominence over the past years and
was intended to be at the forefront of COP 10.
Southern delegates constantly highlighted the
urgency of action and the conference was someti-
mes unofficially dubbed the „Adaptation COP“. The
concern about climate impacts was not only confir-
med by eye-witness accounts of representatives of
indigenous communities, but also by in-depth, long-
term scientific reports such as the Arctic Climate
Impact Assessment9, which attested to the fact that
global warming impacts are already being felt
across the world today. The latter study demonstra-
tes that the extent of the sea ice in the Arctic basin
has decreased by 10% and the thickness by 40%
between 1979 and 2003. The researchers emphasise
that this development has already had detrimental
impacts on human health, food security and cultu-
re in the region. This underlines the urgent need for
decisions on how adaptation efforts can be facilita-
ted in developing countries, as they are the most
vulnerable to climate change. 
However, Article 4.8 UNFCCC, the basis for
negotiations on adaptation measures, refers not
only to the needs and concerns of developing coun-
tries most vulnerable to the impacts of climate
change but also to the adverse effects that climate
protection measures might have on oil-dependent/-
exporting countries. Saudi Arabia and other coun-
tries from the Organisation of the Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries (OPEC) therefore insisted on
including in any relevant decision a reference to the
impacts that measures to reduce emissions („ad-
verse impacts of response measures“10) have on oil-
exporting countries. OPEC countries thus demand
assistance in diversifying the structure of their
economies as well as compensation for their lost
export revenue due to decreased oil consumption in
the industrialised countries. Coupling this demand
with the adaptation needs of poor countries has
effectively forestalled negotiations for a long time,
since providing funds for the rich oil-exporting
countries is unacceptable for most EU Member
States.
Already at COP 9 this linking of issues had pre-
cluded an agreement on urgently needed financing
for Least Developed Countries11. Owing to the per-
sistence of Saudi Arabia and the United States to
maintain the link between adaptation and the
impact of response measures and aided by the COP
President’s decision to couple the negotiations of
adaptation with the negotiations on the seminars,
the “Buenos Aires programme of work on adapta-
tion and response measures”12 was only adopted in
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5 The seminar will take place on 16 and 17 May 2005 in Bonn.
Information Note of the UNFCCC Secretariat, ICA/INF/FEB/05,
16 February 2005.
6 Decision -/CP.10, Seminar of Governmental Experts (SOGE),
advance unedited version. 
7 Ibid.
8 Decision 1/CP.8, Delhi Ministerial Declaration on Climate
Change and Sustainable Development, FCCC/CP/2002/7/Add.1,
28 March 2003.
9 Arctic Council, Impacts of a Warming Arctic – Arctic Climate
Impact Assessment, Cambridge 2004.
10 This term is used in Article 4.8 UNFCCC and Article 3.14 of the
Kyoto Protocol.
11 Ott/Santarius, “Developments in International and European Cli-
mate Policy in 2003”, available at:
http://www.wupperinst.org/COP10/index.html.
12 Decision 1/CP.10, Buenos Aires programme of work on adapta-
tion and response measures, advance unedited version. 
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the early morning hours of the weekend – albeit
without the decisions on financing activities. 
This decision reaffirms the need to implement
previous COP decisions (esp. decision 5/CP.713) on
supporting adaptation efforts to avert negative
impacts of climate change. The measures listed
include urging industrialized countries to provide
financial resources, improving information ex-
change and data availability, advancing vulnerabili-
ty studies and adaptation projects, as well as regu-
lar reporting by the GEF on adaptation activities. In
addition, three regional workshops on adaptation
and one expert meeting for Small Island
Developing States (SIDS) will be conducted before
November 2007. OPEC Parties successfully inclu-
ded a section on the impact of the implementation
of response measures. Although many of their
demands had been compromised, the section still
includes requests for funding two expert meetings
and reporting requirements. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, for the first time the issues of “adaptation”
and “impact of response measures” have been clear-
ly separated from each other, so that it might in the
future be possible to discuss the former without the
latter.
It should be noted that most of the above men-
tioned measures simply reaffirm previous COP
decisions14. The only section of the Buenos Aires
adaptation programme that is completely new
requests the COP’s Subsidiary Body for Scientific
and Technological Advice (SBSTA) to “develop a
structured five-year programme of work on the sci-
entific, technical and socio-economic aspects of
impacts, vulnerability and adaptation”15. An
attempt by Saudi Arabia to also broaden this sec-
tion to response measures failed in the final plena-
ry session. Furthermore, the document calls for an
overall assessment of adaptation activities conduct-
ed within the UNFCCC process at COP 14 in 2008.
The financial mechanisms that intends to provide
funding for the above-mentioned activities includes
the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and
the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF). These
were established at COP 7 in 200116 but are not yet
fully operational. The LDCF currently finances the
preparation of National Adaptation Programmes of
Action (NAPAs), but the demand by developing
countries to finance other activities was not resol-
ved at this COP. This decision was forwarded to SB
22. Similarly, a decision on new guidance to the
SCCF has also been deferred. This was mainly due
to the late agreement on the Buenos Aires adaptati-
on programme, which sets the basis for the SCCF
negotiations. 
IV. Finalising CDM implementation
The implementation of the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) was hotly debated in Buenos
Aires. India launched fierce attacks against the
Executive Board of the CDM (CDM EB) for its work
on ensuring that projects are truly „additional“, i.e.
reduce emissions below those that would have hap-
pened in the absence of the project activity. These
complaints were echoing those of business repre-
sentatives who have been criticising the complexity
of the process since it was adopted. In the end the
work of the CDM EB was for the most part reaffir-
med, but the additionality tool developed by the
CDM EB will be reviewed before COP/MOP 117.
Delegates from developing countries and some
non-governmental organisations were voicing other
concerns throughout the conference. Many of the
projects that are pending approval aim at reducing
emissions of methane and hydro-fluorocarbons.
These are potent greenhouse gases, and mitigation
activities are thus able to generate a great amount
of relatively cheap emissions reduction certificates.
However, as it was claimed, these projects con-
tribute little to the goal of the CDM to assist host
countries in achieving sustainable development.
Some delegations therefore demanded that projects
in the energy and transport sectors be more strong-
ly promoted. Additionally, projects so far tend to
concentrate on countries that provide a good
enabling environment, whereas less developed
countries, in particular most African countries,
have so far been left empty-handed. Those develop-
ing countries therefore repeatedly demanded some
13 Decision 5/CP.7, Implementation of Article 4, paragraph 8 
and 9 of the Convention, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, 21 January
2002.
14 Ibid.
15 See footnote 11 above. 
16 Decision 7/CP.7, Funding under the Convention,
FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, 21 January 2002.
17 Decision -/CP.10, Report of the Executive Board of the clean
development mechanism. Guidance relating to the clean deve-
lopment mechanism, advance unedited version. 
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remedial action to ensure a geographically balanced
distribution of projects and that the sustainable
development goal of the CDM be emphasised.
In addition, the COP requested SBSTA to discuss
how to deal with projects that might be in conflict
with the objectives of other environmental treaties,
aiming to take a decision at COP/MOP 118. This
debate was prompted by HFC-23 decomposition
projects, which are perceived to be in conflict with
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer. HFC-23 is a by-product of produ-
cing HFC-22, which is governed by the Montreal
Protocol. Raising revenues by generating CERs
through the incineration of HFC-23 would lower
the production costs of HFC-22, possibly stimulat-
ing its production and consumption. This would in
turn undermine the purpose of the Montreal
Protocol. Moreover, although HFC-22 is not gov-
erned by the Kyoto Protocol, it is also a potent
greenhouse gas with a global warming potential of
1700 (i.e. 1700 times the global warming potential
of CO2). 
The COP noted that the CDM EB has been over-
loaded and under-funded, and with the entry into
force of the Kyoto Protocol the workload is ex-
pected to grow even further. The UNFCCC secre-
tariat estimates that the CDM EB currently faces a
shortfall of US-$ 4.2 million for the biennium 
2004–200519 and the CDM EB has urgently called
on the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol to raise more
funds.
On a more consensual note, the COP finalised
the special simplified modalities for small-scale
afforestation and reforestation projects20. The 
last missing element of the CDM has thus been put
into place. The threshold for these projects was set 
at 8000 t CO2 estimated sequestration per annum.
The conference agreed to reduce costs by excluding
these projects from the adaptation levy and by
reducing administrative fees (although the exact
amounts have not yet been decided). One and 
the same operational entity will be allowed to carry
out validation, verification and certification. The
COP requested the CDM EB to develop default
factors for assessing the existing carbon stocks 
and for simplified baseline methodologies as well
as simplified monitoring methodologies. No deci-
sion was taken on whether or not to allow uni-
lateral CDM projects, i.e. projects that are devel-
oped without participation from an industrialised
country.
V. Other decisions
Three years after the Parties agreed upon frame-
works for capacity building in developing coun-
tries21 and in countries with economies in transiti-
on22 as part of the Marrakesh Accords (COP 7), the
review of their implementation was finalised. The
final decisions on capacity building confirm that
the scope of capacity building needs, which are out-
lined in these frameworks, are still relevant and
they list some key factors that could assist its furt-
her implementation23.
Another element of the Marrakesh Accords,
namely the rules for accounting of land use, land-
use change and forestry (LULUCF) activities under
Article 3.3 and 3.424, was implemented by a COP
decision on good practice guidance for reporting in
the national inventories25. Article 3.3 and 3.4 allow
Parties to count net removals of CO2 from the
atmosphere and its storage in biomass through
LULUCF activities towards their Kyoto targets. The
guidance adopted by COP 10 is based on the IPCC
Good Practice Guidance26 and completes the
requirements for the establishment of the national
reporting on greenhouse gas emissions under the
Kyoto Protocol. 
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18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Decision -/CP.10, Simplified modalities and procedures for
small-scale afforestation and reforestation project activities
under the clean development mechanism in the first commit-
ment period of the Kyoto Protocol and measures to facilitate
their implementation, advance unedited version. 
21 Decision 2/CP.7, Capacity building in developing countries
(non-Annex I Parties), FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, 21 January
2002.
22 Decision 3/CP.7, Capacity building in countries with economies
in transition, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, 21 January 2002.
23 Decision -/CP.10, Capacity building in developing countries
(non-Annex I countries), advance unedited version; Decision -
/CP.10, Capacity building in countries with economies in transi-
tion, advance unedited version.
24 Decision 11/CP.7, Land use, land-use change and forestry,
FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, 21 January 2002.
25 Decision -/CP.10, Good practice guidance for land use, land-use
change and forestry activities under Article 3, paragraphs 3 and
4, of the Kyoto Protocol, advance unedited version.
26 IPCC, Good Practice Guidance for Land Use, Land-Use Change
and Forestry, Kanagawa/Japan 2003.
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Finally, COP 10 adopted decisions27 on the review
of greenhouse gas inventories28, on the reporting
format for the different types of emissions certi-
ficates under the Kyoto Protocol29 and on the re-
gistry system to administer those emissions certi-
ficates30. 
VI. Silver linings
Despite the rather meagre official outcome, not all
was deepest shadow at COP 10. First, observers
noted some indications that COP 10 may have seen
a movement away from the rather dominant role
OPEC has played in the G-77 and China. Least deve-
loped countries have in the past neglected their
own interests in order to maintain a unified positi-
on within the G-77 and China. However, at COP 10
the LDCs and a number of other developing coun-
tries showed a new assertiveness. For example,
Quatar, which has the presidency of the G-77 this
year, was taken to task by other countries for repre-
senting primarily OPEC interests while neglecting
those of the LDCs and AOSIS. AOSIS delegates and
even the Indonesian minister demanded not to mix
up adaptation to climate change and “adaptation” to
the impacts of response measures. In addition,
developing countries showed different levels of
support for the seminars. If this trend continues,
opportunities for new alliances in favour of mea-
ningful climate action might arise. 
Another positive landmark was the presentation
of the initial national communications of Brazil31
and China32, which provide detailed accounts of
the magnitude and the sources of greenhouse gas
emissions as well as policies and measures taken by
both countries. The dominant source of emissions
in Brazil derives from deforestation of its vast
forests, whereas China’s emissions stem mainly
from the heavy use of coal for power generation
and heating. Being the most populous country in
the world and undergoing extremely rapid indus-
trialisation, China’s report on national emissions
and climate policy is critical in understanding the
state of the global climate. India had already sub-
mitted its initial national communication earlier in
200433. The submission of these documents by
three of the leading powers among the developing
countries is a strong signal of their continuing com-
mitment to the climate regime. It also signals a new
alliance between these countries.
There are furthermore several developments out-
side of the UNFCCC process that provide some rea-
son for greater optimism regarding climate policy
in the United States. It is becoming increasingly
obvious that the approach of the current adminis-
tration does not represent a countrywide consensus
on global warming and the same is true for
Australia. Several side events reported that federal
States in these countries as well as individual com-
panies are increasingly taking climate policy into
their own hands. For example, California has
recently passed ambitious standards for vehicular
emissions reductions34 and several states in the
north-east of the US as well as some of the
Australian states are embarking on regional emis-
sions trading schemes35. 
In yet another twist, the failure of the political
process in the last remaining industrialised States
outside the Kyoto Protocol encourages political
actors to resort to the law courts. In the latest
instance, the Inuit announced to file a petition with
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
against the United States, arguing that global warm-
ing violates their rights to life, residence, the invio-
lability of their homes, health and well-being36. The
number of climate-related cases in court has thus
27 A list of all COP decisions is available at: http://unfccc.int/
meetings/cop_10/items/2944.php.
28 Decision -/CP.10, Issues relating to the technical review of
greenhouse gas inventories of Parties included in Annex I to the
Convention and the implementation of Article 8 of the Kyoto
Protocol, advance unedited version.
29 Decision -/CP.10, Standard electronic format for reporting Kyoto
Protocol units, advance unedited version.
30 Decision -/CP.10, Issues relating to registry systems under Article
7, paragraph 4, of the Kyoto Protocol, advance unedited version.
31 Ministry of Science and Technology, Brazil`s Initial National
Communication to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change, Brasilia 2004.
32 The People’s Republic of China, Initial National Communication
on Climate Change. Executive Summary, Beijing, 2004.
33 Ministry of Environment and Forests / Government of India, Indi-
a’s Initial National Communication to the United Nations Fra-
mework Convention on Climate Change, New Delhi 2004.
34 Assembly Bill No. 1493, Pavley, further information available at:
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/cc.htm. 
35 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) by 9 Northeast and
Mid-Atlantic States, further information available at:
http://www.rggi.org; New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abate-
ment Scheme, further information available at:
http://www.greenhousegas.nsw.gov.au. 
36 Inuit Circumpolar Conference Executive Council Resolution
2003-O1, Re: Climate Change and Inuit Human Rights, 2003.
See also Wagner/Goldberg, An Inuit Petition to the Inter-Ameri-
can Commission on Human Rights for Dangerous Impacts of
Climate Change, Buenos Aires 2004.
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increased to ten, covering seven countries in both
the Northern and the Southern hemisphere. The
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (Aus-
tralia), for example, has ruled that an approval for
the operation of a lignite coal power station is
invalid if impacts of greenhouse gas emissions are
not taken into account in the approval process37. 
VII. Ways ahead
The tenth Conference of the Parties in Buenos Aires
was in a rather strange position: While only a few
issues surrounding the Kyoto Protocol remained to
be resolved before its first Meeting of the Parties,
COP 10 had no mandate to discuss the future of the
climate regime. The European Union in this situati-
on supported the idea introduced by Ambassador
Estrada, to organise two seminars in 2005 for the
discussion of future directions – and opened a hot
debate on the future process. The focus of the EU
was thus not on celebrating the entry into force of
the Protocol or the immediate challenges ahead,
especially the implementation of the Kyoto Proto-
col, but rather on the future of the regime after
2012.
The tendency to always focus on the challenges
ahead of the problems at hand may reflect a gene-
ral tendency of the EU and may well be deeply
engrained in its collective psyche. This is clearly
visible in its never-ending reform and enlargement
process that aims at the next step before one stage
has even been fully initiated. Whether applying
this approach to the climate policy process is help-
ful, remains to be seen. The EU strategy at COP 10
certainly put the United States centre stage once
again in a meeting that could have been much more
positive and forward-looking. As a negative side
effect, this strategy prevented the formation of a
strategic alliance with countries like China, India
and Brazil because it encouraged them to move into
the camp of the United States and Saudi Arabia. 
The EU is of course faced with a difficult situa-
tion, considering that the Kyoto Protocol is entering
into force with no prospect of US participation in
the near future. Additionally, the internal opposi-
tion to further action is mounting: The enactment
of the EU emissions trading system woke up indus-
try, lobbyists and economics ministries in all of its
Member States, which are now putting immense
pressure on the Commission and the Council not to
move any further – at least not without the US and
major State actors from the global South. From the
other side, there is increasing pressure from scien-
tists and the environmental movement not to stand
still on Kyoto but instead to further expand its com-
mitments. Seizing the opportunity presented by the
seminars was thus understandable. The last-minute
agreement on the seminar might even be consid-
ered a successful attempt to integrate the US in
“talks about talks about talks” about the future
framework of the regime.
Nevertheless, the real challenge for the immedi-
ate future lies in the implementation of the Kyoto
Protocol. Making all the rules, mechanisms and
institutions work will require immense personal
and also financial investments, for example by
increasing the funding for the CDM Executive
Board to make it more effective. Moreover, the suc-
cessful implementation of the first commitment
period will determine whether the cap-and-trade
approach taken in the Kyoto Protocol is viable and
can thus serve as a model for the time after 2012. If
the European Union has an interest in seeing more
obligations of this kind in the future, this is where
it should invest. This would appear to be a worth-
while investment, because there is a great likeli-
hood that any future US administration willing to
engage seriously in climate policy will opt for a cap-
and-trade model. This is what the United States
proposed for Kyoto, it is the approach chosen by the
McCain/Liebermann bill38 and the Regional Green-
house Gas Initiative of the north-eastern States in
the US also builds on a power plant cap-and-trade
system39. 
Consolidating the Kyoto architecture therefore
will at the same time provide a framework for the
future regime after 2012. Planning this future will
start later this year: In 2005, industrialised coun-
tries are required to show “demonstrable progress”
in achieving their commitments (Article 3.2 Kyoto
Protocol) and they are furthermore requested to
start “initiating the consideration” of future com-
mitments for industrialised countries after 2012
(Article 3.9 Kyoto Protocol). The first COP/MOP of
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37 VCAT, Judgment in Case No. P2257/2004, Australian Conser-
vation Foundation v Minister for Planning [2004] VCAT 2029,
29 October 2004. 
38 Bill Number S.139 for the 108th Congress, Climate Stewardship
Act of 2003.
39 See footnote 35 above.
JEEPL 2|2005
JEEPL 2-2005#4  07.04.2005  10:01 Uhr  Seite 90
Climate Policy at COP 10 in Buenos Aires and Beyond
the Kyoto Protocol will take place from 28 No-
vember to 9 December 2005 in Montreal, Canada,
in conjunction with the COP of the FCCC. This
body will have to initiate such considerations – not
only in relation to commitments for industrialised
countries, but also for some developing countries.
Expanding commitments to at least some develop-
ing countries (and the US) will also be a most like-
ly demand of the second COP/MOP, which has to
review the Protocol in the light of the best available
scientific information assessments on climate
change and its impacts (Article 3.9 Kyoto Protocol). 
One of the main challenges of these future nego-
tiations is to refine the categories of countries in the
climate regime beyond the rather crude differentia-
tion into “Annex II”, “Annex I” and “non-Annex I”
countries. This means in particular to further dif-
ferentiate between countries that have not yet
adopted quantified mitigation commitments (non-
Annex I countries). This group of countries is too
heterogeneous to be treated alike in future agree-
ments on global mitigation efforts, since it com-
prises countries that are as different as Asian Tigers
on the one hand and most African countries on the
other. A recent proposal by 14 researchers, most of
them from developing countries, addresses this
issue by presenting an approach for differentiation
among non-Annex I countries40. The “South-North”
approach takes into account specific national cir-
cumstances of a country, like the potential and the
capability to mitigate, as well as the responsibility
for causing climate change. The proposal identifies
four groups of countries and designates different
types and levels of mitigation commitments for
each of them. The groups of “Newly Industrialised
Countries” (e.g. South Korea, Saudi Arabia) and
“Rapidly Industrialising Countries” (e.g. China,
Brazil) are envisaged to take on quantified emis-
sions limitation and reduction commitments in the
near future, which is in line with all scenarios
aiming at less than 2° C warming compared to the
pre-industrial level. It should be noted, however,
that these commitments are conditional on finan-
cial transfers from Annex I-countries to support
required mitigation activities. 
Nonetheless, before negotiations on the design
of a future agreement can start, the forum for nego-
tiations has to be agreed upon (COP or COP/MOP).
Negotiating in the context of the COP/MOP of the
Kyoto Protocol, as described above, has one disad-
vantage since it does not include the United States
as a party but as an observer. There were consider-
ations by some parties in Buenos Aires that the
post-2012 negotiations should take place in the con-
text of the FCCC in order to allow the full partici-
pation of the USA. This, however, could be inter-
preted as “abandoning” the Kyoto Protocol. Imple-
mentation and development of the flexible mecha-
nisms would thus be impaired because of seeming-
ly missing support for the Protocol. 
It might therefore be advisable to combine the
strengths of both treaties and create a forum for
negotiations of the post-2012 phase that operates
under the guidance of the COP of the FCCC as well
as under the guidance of the COP/MOP of the Kyoto
Protocol. In such a combined negotiating forum the
US would be participating as a party, while the
integrity of the Kyoto Protocol would be main-
tained. Negotiations could easily move to whatever
forum will be agreed upon in the end. Large devel-
oping countries that are wary of taking on commit-
ments before the North has shown leadership might
also feel comfortable with this solution. 
In the end it takes two to tango, as the saying
goes. The European Union will have to decide
whether to wait for an unwilling partner or
whether to look for more promising dancers like
China, India and Brazil in the meantime. COP 10 in
Buenos Aires allowed a first exploration of ideas.
The mounting impacts of climate change, pressure
from industry and farmers as well as prospects of
making business with the EU, Japan and China will
in the end drive the United States back into the
multilateral climate regime. History favours those
with a long breath. The European Union as a new
actor on the world stage still has to prove that it is
able to strategically pursue its interests.
40 Ott/Winkler/Brouns et al., South-North Dialogue on Equity in
the Greenhouse. A proposal towards an adequate and equitable
global climate agreement, GTZ, 2004. See also:
http://www.south-north-dialogue.net.
JEEPL 2|2005 91









10785 Berlin · Germany
Tel.: ++49 30/ 81 45 06-0
Fax: ++49 30/81 45 06-22
ISSN 1613-7272
Sonderdruck_JEEPL 2-2005 Langrock/Sterk  20.04.2005  13:10 Uhr  Seite 114
